Palestinian Liberation Organization- Essay, Research Paper
Palestinian Liberation Organization-
Can the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) justifiably claim to
be ‘the sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.’?
The PLO was set up in 1964 by an Arab League decision in
response to growing signs of Palestinian unrest. The Palestinians
desired to reclaim the lands occupied by Israel, which they felt
belonged to them, as said in the Bible. In 1964 the Arab states
created the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). While it was
supposed to represent the Palestinians, in reality it represented the
views of President Nasser of Egypt, who guided the formation of the
PLO. Its first leader made wild and irresponsible threats to drive
Israelis into the sea, and had little support among Palestinians for
he was seen as a puppet of the Egyptians. In the 1960s Palestinian
students began to form their own organizations independent of control
by Arab governments (although the Syrians, Libyans, and Iraqis
continued to fund and control particular groups). Yasser Arafat
founded an independent Palestinian-run party called Fatah. He is said
to have the backing, for most of the recent past, of about 80% of
the Palestinian people. The position of the Arab governments was that
a PLO under Arab League supervision would be the best way of
satisfying the demands made by an emerging Palestinian national
consciousness. Also, it was felt that through such an organization
Arab governments could control Palestinian political activities.
Ten years after its founding, the PLO was raised to the status
of government. And in 1988, the PLO’s status was to be raised again,
this time to a state in exile. After several negotiations, Arafat
became a Terrorist leader and administrator of self-rule in the West
Bank and the Gaza Strip.
In the 1967 Six Day War, the Arab armies did very badly against
Israel, losing 67,000 square kilometres of land. Palestinians came to
believe that if they were ever to have their land, they would have to
do it themselves. After the 1967 war, the situation changed
drastically. The resistance activities of various guerrilla
organizations, in particular the Al-Fatah and the PFLP, gained the
increasing support of the Palestinians. With Arafat at the helm from
1969 and a resistance-oriented leadership, the PLO was more effective
and played a central role in mobilizing the Palestinians and in
expanding its basis of support both at the local and international
level. The PLO became an umbrella organization for the various
guerrilla groups.
This increase in support was made possible because of the
Al-Fatah’s ability to access to the growing numbers of volunteers
from refugee camps which were freshly swollen due to the 1967 war.
Most of these refugees suffered the frustration of having been
displaced twice in a lifetime. This generated, especially among the
young, a mood of defiance, as they were ready to question the
credibility of the idea of relying on Arab governments to liberate
Palestine. Furthermore, as a consequence of the war a large proportion
of the Palestinian community became territorially united. This brought
the possibility of direct interaction between the various sections of
the Palestinian community that had previously remained isolated from
each other. On the other hand, the inability of the PLO’s conservative
leadership to promote any effective resistance operations culminated
in the eventual transfer of power to the armed-struggle orientated
guerrilla organizations. Thus initially, the PLO had a broad base of
support and represented the desires of the majority of the Palestinian
people.
The origins of the Al-Fatah can be traced back to the mid-1950s
to a group of Palestinians that had neither relinquished their
national identity nor their belief in the necessity of liberating
Palestine via Palestinian means, rather than relying on other Arab
states. Yet, throughout the 1950s the attitude of the Palestinians
remained largely skeptical if not uncommitted to Al-Faith’s ideology.
It was in the 1960s that the situation began to change, enabling
Al-Fatah to expand its organizational structure and base. Under the
leadership of Arafat, Al-Fatah pursued an ideology which simply
stresses the nationalist struggle to liberate Palestine without
dwelling too deeply on any theoretical speculations about the nature
and form of the future Palestinian society. This tactic was essential
in gaining support against other movements, and aided the rise of
Al-Fatah to become the dominating faction within the PLO.
Militarily, the PLO has a broad base of human resources for
recruitment, almost half a million. The PLO has established
across-the-board conscription for all the Palestinian men between the
ages of 18 and 30. As a result, the PLO is able to maintain three
military forces. It could be said then that physically, it did indeed
represent a cross-section of the population. However, even if they
were significant in number, these lower-level members were not
politically potent, and did not have their voices heard. Arafat
continued on his policies, tending to brush aside differing opinions,
leaving many disenchanted with his autocratic rule.
Even before the PLO was declared a state in 1988, it functioned
much like one. This was reflected in much of the powers it possessed.
The PLO has been able to exert what amounts to sovereign powers over
the Palestinian people in war situations. The PLO represented the
Palestinians in wars with Jordan and Lebanon, and during various
incursions into Israel.
The PLO also exercises extradition powers, as on many occasions
Arab governments have turned over to the PLO Palestinians charged with
criminal activities. They were tried and sentenced by the PLO judicial
system. In these ways, it was supposed to represent the people. But
various problems within the PLO undermined its legitimacy as the sole
representative of the Palestinian people. Arafat’s ascendancy to power
on the Palestinian issue had naturally provoked rivals to try the same
tack in their own interest. As a result, maintenance of his supremacy
within the PLO became Arafat’s full time preoccupation. Far from
laying the basis for secular or democratic institutions that one day
might serve as a nation, Arafat recruited Sumni Muslims like himself
into a body known as Fatah, loyal to him on confessional lines.
Unity itself was a mere appearance, a show for the sake of
recovering honour. Far from uniting behind the Palestinian cause as
words might indicate, every Arab state in practice discriminated
against Palestinians living in its midst and had differing slants
upon the PLO. This was due to its nature as an umbrella organization,
the PLO comprises a number of resistance organizations. These
organizations entered the PLO as groups retaining their ideological
and organizational identity. Consequently, PLO institutions are
structured to reflect proportional representation of each organization
in addition to the few independent members. This has turned PLO
politics into coalition politics. The flux of events between 1967 and
1982 offered Palestinians several chances to demonstrate en masse in
favour of the PLO, if they had been so inclined. But they refrained,
not due to fatalism or cowardice, but because they may be willing to
pay lip service to Arafat, not much more than that.
Whether Palestinians outside the Occupied Territories would in
fact accept the legitimacy of the PLO as their representative was put
to test in Jordan in 1970. Jordanian frontiers were the result of
British map-making, which left half of the country’s inhabitants
Palestinian by origin. The rapid financing and arming by Arab power
holders of Arafat’s mercenaries offered these Palestinians in Jordan a
chance to repudiate King Hussein and declare themselves nationalists
for the new cause. Unexpectantly, Arafat’s power challenge threatened
to replace King Hussein with a PLO state in Jordan. After 18 months,
while tensions were running high, the PFLP hijacked international
airliners, three of which were brought at gunpoint to Jordan. Taking
advantage of this anarchic jockeying between rival Palestinian groups,
King Hussein ordered his army to subjugate the whole movement.
Palestinians in Jordan and on the West Bank gave evidence of their
real feelings by denouncing the PLO and PFLP activists to the
authorities and occasionally even helping to round them up.
David Pryce-Jones observed that “wherever they live, they
observe for themselves that the PLO is a means to enrichment and
aggrandizement for the unscrupulous few, but death and destruction for
everyone else”. Everywhere Palestinians have little alternative but to
cling to this identity, as they continue to seek what freedom they can
from power holders of different identity. In Syria, any Palestinian
who attempted to form some independent grouping would be seen as a
dangerous conspirator and summarily disposed of. This left many with
no choice but to remain silent.
Fatah itself was split by power struggles initiated by a growing
number of young Fatah activists who were trying to gain positions of
power in local society, in the process challenging the older
generation of Fatah leaders. They felt entitled to positions in the
structures Arafat was trying to create. The newest generation of
people not only refuse to be cajoled or coerced, but also have
acquired political organizing and networking skills in neighbourhoods,
refugee camps, Israeli jails, and above all, in the political bodies
created during the Intifada (uprising).
The problem of factionalism has plagued the PLO from its
formation. However, instead of adopting a policy of inclusion to
accommodate the general goals of the people, he excluded not only the
opposition but also the local Palestinians who had acted as his
proxies before his return. He had promised he would be the leader of
all Palestinians, but acted only like the President of his trusted
lieutenants. Instead of speaking of tolerance and political pluralism,
he spoke of respect for his authority.
On top of this, Arafat’s leadership was questioned. Arafat was
criticized for filling his posts with loyalists whose professional
qualifications are below average and whose reputations are tarnished.
Other appointments brought more and more Palestinians to the
conclusion that Arafat was mired in the past, and that he would
continue to follow the policy plans he had formed long ago.
The Chairman’s primacy within the PLO had been seriously
compromised as a result of the secret negotiations that had led to
the September 13, 1993 agreement with the Rabin government. The
relationship with the masses that the charismatic Arafat had enjoyed
was diminished by the concessions he made to Israel. In modern day
politics, he still remains a symbol of Palestinian nationalism, as
does the PLO. But he faces much opposition. On the left various
socialist groups think Arafat is too close to business and banking
interests and too willing to negotiate with Israel or cooperate with
America. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine is one of
these. It is led by George Habash, a Christian doctor. It opposes any
negotiations. On the right some Islamic groups feel the PLO is too
willing to cooperate with socialists and is too willing to negotiate
with Israel. They feel there should be a united Palestine where Jews
could live but which would not be governed by Jews. The largest of
these groups is called HAMAS, the Islamic Resistance Movement. Several
Palestinian radicals have their own military organizations. Abu Nidal
is one of these. He is bitterly and violently opposed to the PLO for
what he sees as its moderate positions. He has carried out airplane
bombings and attacks on civilians and has tried to assassinate Arafat.
He opposes any negotiation with Israel. He is probably funded by Iraq.
In the latest turn of events, Yasser Arafat has decided to scrap
the anti-Israeli section of the PLO charter calling for its
destruction. Some have said that this is due to Israeli pressure in
the peace process, which demanded the change before new talks and
settlements. Shimon Peres has called it the “most important
ideological change of the century”, but it is sure to upset the
Islamic fundamentalists, and those in the PLO who desire a completely
pro-PLO solution. While there is so much contention and opposition to
PLO decisions, the PLO cannot be called the sole representative of the
Palestinian people, although it has a large following.
—
Bibliography
David Pryce-Jones: The Closed Circle: An Interpretation of the Arabs.
Harper Perennial, New York, 1991
Peter Calrocovessi: World Politics since 1945 (5th Ed) Longman Group,
New York, 1987
Kamal Kirisai: The PLO and World Politics. Frances Pinter, London,
1986
Muhammad Muslih : Arafat’s Dilemma
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